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[So F. No. 19451. In Bank. June 19,1956.]

FREDERICK SHEETS LORENZ, Appellant, V. BOARD
OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, Respondent.
[1] Physicians-Licenses-Revocation-Oonviction of Orime Involving Moral Turpitude.-Under the plain language of Bus.
& Prof. Code, § 2383, it is the conviction alone of an offense
involving moral turpitude that empowers the Board of Medical
Examiners to suspend or cancel a physician's license, and since
the record of conviction is conclusive evidence of the unprofessional conduct, the circumstances in which the crime was in
fact committeu cannot be considered.
l2] Id. - Licenses - Revocation - Oonviction of Orime Involving
Moral Turpitude.-Moral turpitude must be inherent in the
crime itself to warrant cancellation or suspension of a physician's license because of a conviction of the crime; it is not
inherent in the crime unless a conviction in every case would,
evidence bad moral character. Onlv if the minimum elements'
for a conviction necessarily involve "moral turpitude and a con- i
viction cannot be had without proof of facts showing moral
turpitude, can the conviction be held to be of an offense
involving moral turpitude.
[3) Id.-Licenses-Revocation-Oonviction of Orime Involving
Moral Tnrpitude.-The offense of giving an alcoholic beverage
to a person under the age of 21 years does not in every ease
evidence bad moral character, and moral turpitude is therefore
not inherent in the crime itself; hence conviction alone of
such an offense does not warrant suspension or cancellation of a
physician's license under BUi>. & Prof. Code, § 2383. (Disapprovin~ Brainard v. State Board of MedicaZ Examiners, 68
Cn1.App.2d 591, 157 P.2d 7.)
[1] See Oal.Jur., Physicians and Surgeons, § 10 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Physicians and Surgeons, § 44 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1-5] Physicians, § 19; [6] Physicians,
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[4] Id.-Licenses-Revocation-tI"nprofessional Oonduct.-lf other
acts committed at the same time as the offense for which a
licensee is convicted constitute unprofessional misconduct
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2377 et seq.) the licensee may be disciplined therefor, but he must be charged with such acts.
[6] Id. - Licenses - Revocation - Oonviction of Orime Involving
Moral 'l'urpitude.-An offense· that does not necessarily in·
volve moral turpitude may be committed by an act involving
moral turpitude, in which case a licensee cannot be disciplined
under a procedure that makes the record of conviction conclusive evidence of unprofessional conduct, but must be
charged with the fraudulent or immoral act and given a hearing on that charge.
[6] ld.-Licenses-Disciplinary Proceedings.-If disciplinary proceedings are to be had against a physician for unprofessional
conduct in connection with his violation of the Alcoholic Beverage Act, they must be initiated by those charged with that
responsibility.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. Harry J. Neubarth,
Judge. Reversed with directions.
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Proceeding in mandamus to review an order of the Board
of Medical Examiners revoking a physician's license. Judgment denying writ, reversed with directions.
Lowell L. Dryden, Denison, Dietrich & Anderson and Butchinson & Quattrin for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Dan Kaufmann,
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-on October 3, 1952, judgment of conviction
was entered on petitioner's plea of guilty to a violation of
section 61, subdivision (a), (If the Alcoholic Beverage C(lntrol
Actl (now Bus. & Pr(lf. Code, § 25658). On April 9, 1953, a
special investigator for the Board of Medical Examiners filed
with the boara an accusation against petitioner (Gov. Code,
§ 11503) chargi,ng that his conviction was for an offense involving moral turpitude and that he was therefore guilty of
1" Every person who sells, furnishes, gives or causes to be 801d, fur·
nished, or given away. any alcoholic beverage to any person under the
age of 21 years is guilty of a misdemeanor."
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unprofessional conduct under sections 2361' and 23838 of the
Business and Professions Code. It was also alleged that on or
about March 13, 1947, petitioner's license had been revoked
for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, but that.
the revocation was suspended and petitioner placed on probation for five years.
A hearing was held before a hearing officer on February 23,
1954. He found that discipline had been previously imposed
as alleged, that the conviction in question was for giving a
drink of an alcoholic beverage to a 17-year-old boy, but that
the crime did not involve moral turpitude. He recommended
that the accusation be dismissed. The Board of Medical Examiners, however, decided that petitioner had been convicted
of a crime involving moral turpitude and revoked his license
to practice medicine and surgery in California.
Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the
superior court to review the order of the board (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1094.5) and a trial was had on the record before
the board. The court found that ". . . said conviction was
of a crime involving moral turpitude in that it arose from
the furnishing of intoxicating liquor by the petitioner on or
about August 17, 1952 at the Travelodge Motel in Brawley,
California, to a minor ... without just cause or explanation,
and that at said time and place and in connection with the
furnishing of said intoxicating liquor the petitioner did
engage in immoral acts with the said minor" and entered its
order discharging the alternative writ. Petitioner appeals.
[1] Under the plain language of section 2383 it is the
conviction alone of an offense involving moral turpitude that
empowers the board to suspend or cancel a license. Since the
record of conviction is conclusive evidence of the unprofessional conduct, the circumstances in which the crime was in
fact committed cannot be considered. [2] Moral turpitude
must be inherent in the crime itself to warrant cancellation
or suspension of a license because of the conviction. (In
re Hallinan, 43 Cal.2d 243, 248-249 [272 P.2d 768].) Moral
turpitude is not inherent in the crime itself unless a con'''The board shall take action against any holder of a certificate, who
ill guilty of unprofessional conduct.••• " Business and Professions
Code, ~ 2377 et 8eq., specify those acts which constitute unprofessional
conduct.
'''The conviction of a felony, or of any offense involving moral
turpitude, constitutes unprofessional conduct within the meaning of this
chapter. The record of the conviction ill conclusive evidence of wch
unprofessional conduct."
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-nction in every ease would evidence bad moral character.
(Ibid.) Only if the minimum elements for a conviction necessarily involve moral turpitude and a conviction cannot be had
without proof of facts showing moral turpitude, can the conviction be held to be of an offense involving moral turpitude.
(Ibid.)

[3] We have concluded that the offense of giving an alcoholic beverage to a person under the age of 21 years does
not in every case evidence a bad moral character and that
moral turpitude is therefore not inherent in the crime itself.
Conviction alone, therefore, of such an offense does not warrant the suspension or cancellation of a license under section
2383. Brainard v. State Board of Medical Examiflers, 68 Cal.
App.2d 591 [157 P.2d 7}, permitting inquiry into collateral
acts to determine whether a conviction was for an offense
involving moral turpitude is inconsistent with our opinion
herein and is disapproved.
[4] If other acts committed at the same time as the offense
for which a licensee is convicted constitute unprofessional
conduct (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2377 et seq.) the licensee may
be disciplined for those acts. He must, however, be charged
with such acts. (In re Hess, 45 CaUd 171 [288 P.2d 5].) In
the present case petitioner was neither charged nor convicted
of anything but a violation of section 61(a) of the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Act.
[5] An offense that does not necessarily involve moral turpitude may be committed by an act involving moral turpitUde,
e g. section 145, subdivision (b), of the Internal Revenue
(,ode may be violated by intentional fraud (see In re HalUnan,
supra, 43 Cal.2d 243, 253) ; section 61, subdivision (a), of the
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act may be violated by adulterating a nonalcoholic drink with alcohol and inducing a minor
to take it in the belief that it is nonalcoholic. In such eases
a licensee cannot be disciplined under a procedure that makes
the record of conviction conclusive evidence of unprofessional
conduct, but must be charged with the fraudulent or immoral
act and given a hearing on that charge. Petitioner was not
charged with such an act and there is nothing in the record
to indicate any deception or other immoral act in the giving
of the alcoholic beverage.
[6] If further proceedings are to be had against petitioner
for unprofessional conduct in connection with his violation of
the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act they must be initiated
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by those charged with that responsibility. (Of. I'll re Hallinan,
.upra, 43 Cal.2d 243, 253-254.)
The judgment is reversed with instructions to the trial
court to grant a peremptory writ of mandate directing the
board to set aside its order of revocation.
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence,J., and
McComb, J., concurred.
SHENK, J., Dissenting.-The judgment is reversed on the
ground that the crime of which the plaintiff was convicted
(furnishing intoxicating liquor to a minor) does not necessarily involve moral turpitude and that in order to disclose
the circumstances of sex perversion in connection with that
crime it would be necessary independently to charge the plaintiff with, and prove, that particular crime.
I cannot agree with the circuitous course required by the
court under the circumstances of this case. Dr. Lorenz was
cited to answer to the charge of which he had been convicted.
Be appeared before the hearing officer to answer the charge.
Be was represented by connsel. The board was also represented. The judgment of conviction was conclusive evidence
of that conviction. The board proceeded to inquire into the
circumstances surrounding the conduct of the doctor in committing the crime of which he had been convicted. In my
opinion the board had the power to do so. Those circumstances might disclose no moral turpitude. They might disclose conduct amounting to moral turpitude but not constituting a separate criminal offense or they might show an
offense against the criminal laws of the state. If they tended
to disclose any conduct involving moral turpitude the accused
doctor should, in fairness, be given an adequate opportunity
to meet the charge. Such an opportunity was accorded him
in this case. When the board proceeded to inquire into the
homosexual conduct of the accused doctor his counsel stated:
"We know and we anticipated that we would have to meet
this type of charge [homosexual conduct] here . . . So we
selected the two outstanding men in the field of neuro-psychiatry as involves homosexual behavior that we could find,
and we had him [the accused doctor] examined. Those same
two doctors . . . tell you out and out frankly across the
board that Dr. Lorenz is not a homosexual and there is nothing
that would militate against his continuing his practice."
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An objection was made to the introduction of evidence showing homosexual conduct but no objection was made on the
ground that the accused doctor was taken hy surprise or had
no notice that the subject would be investigated. No request
for a continuance was made to enable him to further combat
the charge. In contesting it he introduced evidence of experts
to prove that he was of good character and not homosexually
inclined.
The record supports the conclusion of the board that the
purpose of plying the boy with liquor was in furtherance
of the accused doctor's homosexual intentions and that they
were carried into effect. I see no good reason to require the
roundabout way of proving in an independent action what
has already been disclosed. After the administrative hearing
the accused doctor resorted to the court under established
practice to have the order of the board set aside. After a
court hearing the action of the board was upheld. There was
no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in refusing the aid of the court to relieve the accused of the consequences of his reprehensible conduct. I would affirm the
judgment.

Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied July 18,
1956. Shenk, J., was of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.
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